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THE AFTERMATH OF BURNHAM v. SUPERIOR
COURT: A NEW RULE OF TRANSIENT
JURISDICTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
A resident of New Jersey travels to California and visits his
children for the weekend. While in California, he is served
with a court summons, compelling him to defend a lawsuit in
that state. As a result, this man must travel to and from his
home state of New Jersey in order to defend the action in this
inconvenient forum. Although his initial purposes for visiting
California are entirely unrelated to the lawsuit, the summons
requires him to litigate in that state. This is the practical result
of the "transient rule"' of in personam jurisdiction,' and these
are the facts of the recent United States Supreme Court case,
Burnham v. Superior Court.' This 1990 decision appears to
breathe new life into the traditional doctrine requiring mere
presence as a basis for jurisdiction. In this decision, the Court
upheld jurisdiction as it pertained to a nonresident defendant
present in the state for purposes unrelated to the litigation.'
In order to render a valid and binding judgment, a court
must have personal jurisdiction over each party.' Any judg-
1. The "transient rule" commonly refers to jurisdiction of a nonresident who
is temporarily present in the forum. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 410 (3d ed. 1986). See also Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Ap-
pnach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theo-
ry, 30 EMORY LJ. 729, 729 n.2 (1981) (this theory of jurisdiction is also referred
to as "gotcha" jurisdiction, or "tagged" theory of jurisdiction); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Pesonal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289 (1956).
2. In personam jurisdiction refers to "the power which a court has over the
defendant himself in contrast to a court's power over the defendant's interest in
property (quasi in rem) or power over the property itself (in rem)." Black's Law
Dictionary 791 (6th ed. 1990). See generally 7 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW 506 (1990); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D 63 (1990); JACK H. FRIEDENTrHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 3.1 (1985); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 88
(1969). See also Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74
Minn. L. Rev. 37, 49-50 (1989) (general historical background of personal juris-
diction).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
4. Id.
5. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
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ment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is void." A plain-
tiff voluntarily subjects himself to personal jurisdiction by filing
the lawsuit. This comment focuses on the following question:
At what point is the defendant subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion?
Traditionally, a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a de-
fendant was limited to the defendant's physical presence within
geographical and territorial boundaries! This basis for juris-
diction was grounded on the concept of physical power.8 Once
a court obtained physical power over a defendant, he would be
amenable to a lawsuit in that jurisdiction. These concepts were
immortalized in case law,9 and until the Burnham decision,
were generally accepted.
The implications arising from the traditional rule are
broad.. If a defendant is in a forum for a brief period, and for
reasons totally unrelated to the suit filed against him, the state
is permitted to maintain power over him because he is within
territorial boundaries. The rule provides an exception for de-
fendants who are drawn into the state by force or fraud.'
However, the Supreme Court has questioned the continued
validity of the transient rule in Burnham v. Superior Court.
(1877).
6. JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFUCT OF LAws 326 (1935).
7. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2.
8. Id. Actual physical control over the defendant resulted from the common
law's quasi-criminal nature of personal actions. In most actions, a defendant was
required to be brought before the court and was kept under physical control of
the court. It is said that from this "power concept" emerged the concept of
territoriality as the basis for jurisdiction. But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Tran-
sient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 'Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289 (1956) for an attack on the proposition that jurisdiction at common law
was based on physical power.
9. See Pennoyer v. Neft 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (a court could not render a
judgment against a party who was not within the territorial boundaries of the
state); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915) ("the foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power . . . ").
10. See Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d. Cir. 1937). In this case,
Wyman lured Newhouse to Florida, asserting that she wished to see him. When
he came, he was served with process as he stepped off the airplane. The court
held that Newhouse was induced to enter Florida by fraud, and this rendered the
jurisdiction null and void. See also Wanzer v. Bright, 52 I1. 35 (1869) (state statute
exempting service of process to those brought to forum by force or fraud); Malloy
v. Brewer, 64 N.W. 1120 (S.D. 1895); Burroughs v. Cocke & Willis, 156 P. 196




In this plurality opinion, the Court was unable to agree on
whether to completely discard the traditional rule of jurisdic-
tion, or follow a new, less rigid approach. Justice Scalia, along
with Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, opted to stand behind
the narrow traditional rule developed over the years from
Pennoyer v. Neff." that the criterion of presence is sufficient to
comport with due process, as it always has been. 2
Justice White concurred with the majority of Scalia's opin-
ion."3 He believed that unless it could be shown that the tran-
sient rule is "so arbitrary and lacking in common sense," it
should not be discarded. 4 One instance in which he believed
this showing could be made was when someone's presence in
the forum was unintentional. 5
Justice Brennan, along with Justice O'Connor and Justice
Blackmun, viewed the transient rule as outdated and vulnera-
ble to due process attacks. 6 Their approach was to formulate
a safeguard which used presence as an important factor in
examining the question of jurisdiction, but also required the
application of minimum contacts to all defendants, whether
present in the forum or not."
Justice Stevens, in his brief opinion, merely stated that this
case was an easy one, clearly controlled by precedent. He be-
lieved that the simplicity in deciding a case such as this was
obvious. He felt that the Justices were converting an easy issue
into an ambiguous, complex problem."
All Justices, however, agreed in the final judgment. They
decided that the defendant was served with process while
knowingly and voluntarily in California, and should therefore
be amenable to a lawsuit in that state.'9
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
12. Burnham v. Superior Court; 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990).
13. Id. at 2119-20.
14. Id. Justice White also stated that "he could not possibly" strike down a
rule that has been so widely accepted in this country. Id. at 2119.
15. Id. at 2120.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2122. This is a departure from traditional analysis, which applies
minimum contacts to a defendant, usually a corporation, who is not present in
the forum.
18. Id. at 2126.
19. Id. at 2105.
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The judgment in Burnham actually created a new legal
framework for determining personal jurisdiction. This judg-
ment not only adheres to the traditional rules of Pennoyer, but
extends in personam jurisdiction to those who are in the state
for purposes totally unrelated to the suit. After Burnham, the
Supreme Court would most likely approve of service of a de-
fendant as a passenger on an airplane while it is flying over the
forum," or merely passing through the forum state for rea-
sons unrelated to the litigation."1 The question is, how far will
Burnham go?2 What if the defendant was on the Four Cor-
ners National Monument, where one is able to walk across the
borders of four states? What if the defendant is parachuting
from the sky or in a hot air balloon? What about an astronaut?
After Burnham, the limits are unclear.
This comment focuses on the scope of the Burnham deci-
sion and its aftermath. Section II discusses historical perspec-
tives that provide the foundation for Burnham." This section
also surveys how courts in the past have handled similar issues,
and provides insight into the complexities posed in Burnham.
Section III analyzes the problem that is created by the
Court's unwillingness to agree on one approach, 4 while Sec-
tion IV tackles this problem with a discussion about the doc-
trinal questions raised by Burnham." Section IV also critically
analyzes the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and
Brennan, and in doing so, attempts to predict an alternative to
the tangled solution the Burnham decision presents to the legal
community.
Section V proposes a new approach to the views expressed
in the Burnham decision. 6 This moderate approach attempts
20. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) where a fed-
eral district court upheld service of process on a defendant who was a passenger
on an airplane flying over the forum state.
21. See Nielsen v. Braland, 119 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1963) (jurisdiction over
defendant was valid when served while traveling through forum); Fisher, Brown &
Co. v. Fielding, 34 A. 714 (Conn. 1895) (jurisdiction -upheld over defendant served
while in forum on business that was unrelated to the lawsuit).
22. Even Justice White in Burnham cautioned the use of the transient rule
against those unintentionally present in the forum, but the Court as a whole did
not put limits on its decision. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-121.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 124-74.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
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to fill in the gaps between the two extreme positions that were
articulated in the plurality decision. It seeks a compromise by
allowing the analysis to focus on both presence and minimum
contacts, but also seeks to limit judicial discretion. Under the
proposed approach, minimum contacts would be analyzed as a
factor in determining jurisdiction, but the allowable minimum
contacts would be defined and certain. This new approach
would contain the traditional basis of transient jurisdiction, but
would also assure compliance with due process based on an
objective analysis limited to certain factors.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Transient Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff
Historically, a defendant was made amenable to in perso-
nam jurisdiction if voluntarily present and served with process
within the forum. 7 This transient theory of jurisdiction was
first conceptualized in Pennoyer v. Neff," where physical
presence in the forum was deemed the necessary basis of juris-
diction.
Pennoyer involved two actions between Neff, a resident of
California, and Mitchell, a resident of Oregon. In 1866, Mitch-
ell sued Neff in Oregon to recover legal fees due him."
Mitchell, in accordance with a state statute, published notice of
the action in an Oregon newspaper.' Neff was never person-
ally served, and as a result, was never made aware of the suit
against him. Mitchell obtained a judgment in default, and
Neff's property was sold at a court auction to satisfy the judg-
ment.'
Nine years later, Neff brought an action against Pennoyer,
Mitchell's successor in the property. 2 He contended that the
sale was invalid because the Oregon court never obtained juris-
diction over him in the initial action."3 The Supreme Court
27. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
28. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
30. Id. at 720-21.
31. Id. at 719-20.
32. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
33. Id. at 719-20.
1992] 993
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agreed.' Since Mitchell never personally served Neff in Ore-
gon, he never obtained in personam jurisdiction."
The Court based its decision on state sovereignty. 6 A
state, at that time, was deemed to have complete power over
persons and things within its borders. States were to maintain
complete independence, except when such independence in-
fringed on due process rights." Personal service was the vehi-
cle to (1) assert the state's power over a defendant, and (2) to
give the defendant notice of the action so as to comply with
due process.
The Pennoyer decision is also recognized for its application
of the then newly adopted due process clause"4 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9 Although Pennoyer only briefly discussed
the concept of due process, later courts have interpreted
Pennoyer's language to stand for the principle that a judgment
of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violates due process."
This case established the significance that this principle enjoys
today: that due process requires fairness at every stage of our
judicial system.
Due process was defined in Pennoyer as "a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the pro-
34. Id. at 736.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 722.
37. Id at 720.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. (" . . . nor shall any State deprive any persons
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). Due process is generally
defined as "law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990). Although this definition is vague,
Pennoyer broadened the definition and made it more concrete with respect to
service and notice requirements.
39. The Fourteenth Amendment came into existence in 1868. It is interesting
to note that the due process clause was enacted after the original default action
between Mitchell and Neff (this action occurred in 1866). See Burnham v. Superior
Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2113-14 (1990) Uustice Scalia undermined the significance
of the earliest interpretations of due process, stating that "Pennoyer v. Neff, while
renowned for its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits [exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident who had not been personally
served in the forum], in fact set that forth only as dictum, and decided the
case . . . under 'well-established principles of public law.'").
40. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunleavy, 241 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1916); Coldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 46
(1892).
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tection and enforcement of private rights."4 This included
the "well-established principles of public law"4" that respected
the jurisdiction of the states over persons and property. Thus,
according to Pennoyer, due process required that the defendant
be brought into the state to obtain jurisdiction over him," or
that he be voluntarily present."' These early, simplistic notions
of due process requiring mere presence for jurisdiction began
to erode in later years. Even so, they still remain the
foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction.
B. The Weakening of Pennoyer v. Neff
The presence requirement of Pennoyer made a distinct
impression on the American court system. State courts fervent-
ly began to adopt presence as the sole criterion for jurisdic-
tion." Pennoyer's influence, however, began to diminish in the
nineteenth century when the courts began to weaken its rigid
rules. A new age of mobility for defendants, combined with
the increase in corporations engaging in multi-state business,46
41. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
42. Id. at 722. Public law is concerned with the "organization of the state, the
relations between the state and the people that compose it, the responsibilities of
public officers to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the rela-
tions of states to one another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
43. This is known as the "presence" requirement. In later years, the require-
ment was expanded to include exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
on the theory that "doing business" in a state mandated presence. The rationale
behind this is that a corporation is a group given legal personality, and this group
is present whenever it is carrying on authorized group activities. I JOSEPH H.
BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 360, 384 (1935).
44. This is known as the "consent" requirement. This requirement from
Pennoyer was also expanded in order to acquire jurisdiction over corporations. This
theory is based on the fact that a corporation is organized in one state, and if
they want to carry on business in another state, they need consent by that state.
Under this theory, that state may impose conditions on the corporation, such as
requiring it to submit to jurisdiction brought against it within the state.
45. Williams v. Simon, 122 S.E. 772 (S.C. 1924); Hieston v. National City
Bank of Chicago, 104 A. 281 (Md. 1918); Bowman v. Flint, 82 S.W. 1049 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1904); Lee v. Baird, 36 So. 720 (Ala. 1904); ; Smith v. Gibson, 3 So.
321 (Ala. 1888).
46. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 52. Part C of this article emphasizes the
changes that emerged in the nineteenth century that convinced courts to depart
from the territorial limits imposed by Pennoyer. Included in this revolution were
many modern inventions including the telephone and the automobile. In addition,
the railroad construction boom also made for a more mobile society. Wasserman,
supra note 2, at 52 n.75. The author also cites to Supreme Court cases that re-
flect this view of change: Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall 466
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
made the Supreme Court aware of a need for a more flexible
rule that did not require physical presence within the forum
state.
One way in which the state courts tried to circumvent the
inflexibility of Pennoyer was to create legal fictions to deal with
these new situations.47 The courts would attempt to uphold
personal jurisdiction not by following the rule in Pennoyer, but
by following their own ideas of what conduct should be the
basis ofjurisdiction, including "doing business" within the state
and "implied consent" to jurisdiction."8
The strict limits of Pennoyer"9 were specifically set aside by
a group of Supreme Court decisions that deviated from the
presence rule. In St. Clair v. Cox,' the Court upheld a Michi-
gan statute providing that one condition of doing business in
the state was that a state agent had to be appointed as a proxy
for the company. This made the company amenable to any suit
pursued in that state.' In Hess v. Pawlowski,' a Massachusetts
statute providing for in- state "substituted service of process"
for nonresident motorists who caused injuries in that state was
upheld.-" In Kane v. New Jersey," the Court also upheld a
New Jersey statute as a method to issue service of process to a
nonresident. These cases were upheld during this period on
the grounds that due process was not violated because the
presence and consent requirements set forth in Pennoyer were
satisfied.
U.S. 408, 422 (1984) (an expanding national economy) and St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (increase in amount of corporations). Wasserman, supra note
2, at 52 n.74.
47. See I JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 360, 382
(1935) (a comprehensive discussion on the presence and consent theories of juris-
diction, and the author's criticism of these fictions).
48. Id.
49. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
50. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
51. Id. at 353-57 (the statute authorized service of process on "any officer,
member, clerk, or agent" of a foreign corporation doing business in the state to
obtain personal jurisdiction). See also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404,
408 (1856) (Ohio statute imposed service on a corporation's agent as a substitute
for personal service).
52. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
53. Id. at 356-57. Substituted service refers to the fiction that a state may
appoint an agent as a proxy for anyone entering the state, in order to obtain
jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
54. 242 U.S. 160, 169 (1916).
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During this period, courts were apprehensive in applying
the presence rule too stringently since this would unduly place
burdens on those corporations who were "physically present"
in many states by nature of their business. This would also
burden those individual defendants who traveled frequently
from state to state. The courts instead chose to circumvent
these problems by expanding the application of the presence
rule for these mobile people. One such expansion was the
"minimum contacts" test.
C. International Shoe and the Birth of Minimum Contacts
In International Shoe v. Washington," the Supreme Court
rejected the legal fictions that were previously used and creat-
ed a new, more flexible rule concerning in personam jurisdic-
tion. In this case, the Court addressed the issue as to whether
the State of Washington could assert in personam jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation not physically present in the state, but
still conducting business in Washington.' Chief Justice Stone
articulated the new test for obtaining jurisdiction to persons
not physically present in the state. He stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."57
This test entails a two-step inquiry. First, are there the
requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and the
forum state? Secondly, is due process violated by denying or
granting jurisdiction in that particular forum?
55. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56. In International Shoe, taxes for unemployment compensation were assessed
on International Shoe Co., a Delaware corporation with its principle place of busi-
ness in Missouri. Some of the corporation's salesmen lived and worked in the
state of Washington. When International Shoe Co. refused to pay the tax to the
state of Washington, the state sued. The Washington statute provided that service
of process could be performed by serving one of International Shoe's salesmen,
who were considered agents of the corporation, in addition to sending a copy of
the summons to the main office. The Supreme Court held that there were
enough minimum contacts in Washington to assert jurisdiction. Id.
57. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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In applying the minimum contacts test, the Court listed
certain guidelines that had evolved from prior decisions.'
First, a defendant is subject to the forum state's jurisdiction if
its activities there had been systematic and continuous, and
those activities were related to the present cause of action."
Secondly, single, unrelated acts, or activity that is only casually
related to the action, would not give rise to jurisdiction.'
Thirdly, even if the action is unrelated to the forum, continu-
ous activity may make the defendant amenable to
jurisdiction."' Finally, a defendant's casual or single act may
make him amenable to jurisdiction if the action arose from the
defendant's activity in the forum.
In applying the second step concerning due process,
courts are reluctant to provide guidelines. Since due process is
a nebulous concept and entails a "totality of the circumstanc-
es," each judge has his own idea as to how it should be ap-
plied.
Essentially, International Shoe stood for the notion that due
process does not require states to adhere to the strict territori-
al limits placed on them by Pennoyer.6" The new "minimum
contacts" test would, in effect, be a substitute for physical pres-
ence. The test for jurisdiction no longer focused upon the
defendant's physical relationship to the forum, but rather up-
on the defendant's activity in relation to the forum." This
58. 326 U.S. at 317, 318.
59. Id. at 317.
60. Id. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See also text accom-
panying infra notes 79-85.
61. Id. at 318. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952). See also text accompanying infra notes 73-78.
62. Id. See, e.g, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1951). See
also text accompanying infra notes 65-72.
63. For the Court's most recent analysis involving due process requirements
for the minimum contacts test, see Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
64. Rather than demand presence as the sole basis of jurisdiction, courts
could now look at "the quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure." 326 U.S. at 319. Fairness now became the test, and




added dimension of inquiry more readily satisfied the pursuit
of conforming with due process because it made in personam
jurisdiction more flexible and more adaptable to societal
needs.
D. Stretching Minimum Contacts to the Limit
After International Shoe, the Supreme Court struggled to
define what "minimum contacts" actually entailed, since none
of their previous opinions articulated a well-defined test. Dur-
ing this period, the Court provided no guidance other than
the words of International Shoe. As a result, the courts were
free to expand personal jurisdiction.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.65 was part of this ex-
pansion. In this case, the defendant, a Texas life insurance
company, had issued a policy to the decedent, a resident of
California." The insurance company billed the decedent in
California and received her payments from California." When
the decedent died, defendant refused to pay the claim made
by the plaintiff.' Plaintiff sued in California, and served de-
fendant by mail, which was permitted by a state long-arm stat-
ute.' The California court held for the plaintiff, but when
plaintiff tried to enforce the judgment in Texas, Texas courts
claimed lack of personal jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in California,
based on the single contact of the insurance policy in that
state. The Justices asserted that their decision complied with
due process7 because of the substantial connection that the
insurance policy had with the state. The Court reasoned that




69. Most states have long-arm statutes to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent. Long-arm statutes provide for personal jurisdiction, via substituted service of
process, over persons and corporations which are nonresidents of the state and
which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by agent. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY
942 (6th ed. 1990). Discussion of such statutes, however, are beyond the scope of
this comment.
70. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221.
71. Id. at 222. The McGee decision cited Penioyer, and observed that in that
case the due process clause limits the state courts from entering binding judg-
ments against those who were not served within the forum's boundaries. This
decision indicated the Texas court's belief that the jurisdictional basis is presence.
1992]
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the policy was delivered to California, the premiums were paid
from there, and the insured resided there. For these reasons,
California had an interest in providing a forum for its citi-
zens." Based on this rationale, a single transaction within the
forum state became sufficient to establish jurisdiction based on
minimum contacts.
Another Supreme Court decision extending in personam
jurisdiction for a cause of action arising out of remote activi-
ties in the forum occurred in 1952. In Perkins v. Benguet Consol-
idated Mining Co.,"3 the plaintiff was permitted to sue the de-
fendant, the president of a Philippine company, in Ohio, even
though the claim was unrelated to activities within that state.74
The claim actually arose out of the company's activities by
the company in the Philippines, where it company operated
gold and silver mines.75 The president of the company, howev-
er, lived in Ohio and set up an office there. The president's
activities in Ohio were supervisory, i.e., he attempted to reha-
bilitate the halted operations of the mines from that location.
He also maintained correspondence and financed the opera-
tions from Ohio.76
The Court upheld jurisdiction in Ohio, stating that these
activities were systematic and continuous, and were substantial
enough to create jurisdiction over the company." This broad
application of the minimum contacts test took the Court "one
step further to a proceeding in personam to enforce a cause of
action not arising out of the corporation's activities in the state
of the forum."'
72. Id. at 223.
73. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
74. One reason for the Court's decision to uphold jurisdiction in Ohio may
have been military outbreak in the Philippines. Since this made it impossible to
sue there, the Court may have upheld jurisdiction under the guise of minimum
contacts in order for the plaintiff to have his day in court.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 447-48.
77. Id. at 445-46. The court cited International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19, where
there were some circumstances in which continuous operations by a corporation
.were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 342
U.S. at 445-46.
78. 342 U.S. at 446.
1000 [Vol. 32
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E. Limiting the Minimum Contacts Test
In Hansen v. Denckla," the Supreme Court started to im-
pose limits on the newly expanded minimum contacts test.'
This case arose from the probate of a will. Dora Donner lived
in Pennsylvania and executed a trust naming a Delaware com-
pany as trustee. She later moved to Florida, where she received
income from the trust, and received information regarding the
trustee's actions."' After her death, her daughters sued in
Florida, contesting the testamentary disposition. 2
The Supreme Court ruled that Florida did not properly
obtain jurisdiction in this matter." It reasoned that the defen-
dant must engage in some activity in the forum where he "pur-
posefully avails" himself of the privilege of conducting business
within that state, "thus invoking the benefits and protection of
its laws."' The Court stressed that the defendant must some-
how affiliate himself with the forum in order to coerce him to
defend a lawsuit in that state." The Court found that the
mere act of making trust payments to a resident of a state was
not a sufficient contact to "affiliate himself" with the forum.
Another restriction on the minimum contacts test arose
from the case of Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall.' This case distinguished general jurisdiction, in which
the claim and the contacts are unrelated, from specific jurisdic-
tion, in which the claim arises from the contacts. 7 This case
involved a helicopter crash in Peru." The defendant was a
79. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
80. The Court noted that the minimum contacts test should not preclude
placing limits on state court jurisdiction. Id. at 251. This decision indicates that
the Court is principally concerned with what contacts or activities are sufficient.
81. Id. at 238-39.
82. Id. at 240. Another action was brought in Delaware by the executrix of
the will, seeking to determine who takes the trust assets. Id. at 242. The Delaware
court and the Florida court reached different conclusions, with the Florida court
validating jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees. Id. at 241.
83. Id. at 251.
84. Id. at 253.
85. Id.
86. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
87. See generally Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEXAS L REV. 723, 727-72 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 614-43 (1988); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 55 n.84.
88. 466 U.S. at 408.
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corporation in Colombia, that owned and operated the heli-
copters. The activity in relation to Texas, the forum state, con-
sisted only of the purchase in Texas of supplies, the acceptance
of a check from that state, and the training of helicopter pilots
there." The Supreme Court held that this was a case of gener-
al jurisdiction, and therefore could not uphold jurisdiction in
the absence of continuous and systematic contacts.' These
single, unrelated incidents could not justify compelling a Peru-
vian corporation to defend a suit in Texas."
These cases established the state of the law during this
period and further defined "minimum contacts." It became evi-
dent that the Court would not accept, as a substitute for pres-
ence, less than continuous and systematic contacts with the fo-
rum, or purposeful availment by the defendant of the benefits
of the forum. Whether these tests were only to be applied to
defendant corporations or extended to individual defendants
not present in the forum was unclear until 1977.
F. In Rem Jurisdiction Distinguished: Shaffer v. Heitner
In 1977, the Supreme Court again addressed the applica-
tion of the minimum contacts test in Shaffer v. Heitner." In
one sweeping statement, the Court decided that the minimum
contacts test was to be applied to "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction."" At first glance, the decision seemed to chal-
lenge the means of obtaining personal jurisdiction by service
of process set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff.' However, courts have
since distinguished this case on its facts, thereby preserving the
89. Id. at 418.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court, when analyzing the purchase of supplies from Texas, held
that mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, is not enough to satisfy
jurisdiction over a defendant corporation in a cause of action unrelated to those
purchase transactions. Commenting upon the training of the pilots in the forum
as a basis of jurisdiction, the Court noted that brief presence in the state here
was not a significant contact. Id.
92. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
93. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
94. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Prior to Shafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977),
the practical effect of the minimum contacts test was that it was only applied to
corporations which were abstractly "present" in the forum. Shaffer was the first
time the Court reviewed the question of an individual defendant who was present
only by virtue of minimum contacts.
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presence requirement set forth in traditional in personam cas-
es.
Shaffer involved quasi in rem jurisdiction.-' In this case,
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, filed suit in a Delaware
court against Greyhound Corporation and its directors and
officers." Although Greyhound was incorporated in Delaware,
its principal place of business was Arizona, and the act at issue
occurred in Oregon." In addition, all individual defendants
were nonresidents of Delaware.98 The only contact with the
forum that any of the parties had was based on a Delaware law
providing that the situs of the stock of an entity incorporated
in that state is considered to be in Delaware." Under this law,
Heitner filed to sequester the Delaware property belonging to
the individual defendants."°
The defendants argued that Delaware courts lacked juris-
diction because they did not have minimum contacts with the
forum,"' as required by International Shoe v. Washington.'
Heitner, however, argued that this suit was brought under
quasi in rem jurisdiction. He argued that this theory merely
required a relationship between the property and the state, and
not the defendants and the state.'
The Supreme Court held that Delaware's assertion of
jurisdiction violated due process."° Jurisdiction based solely
on presence of property could no longer be decisive. It must
still satisfy due process."5 In order to satisfy due process, the
Court concluded that International Shoe's minimum contacts
test must be applied to every exercise ofjurisdiction."°
The sweeping language used in this opinion"' broad-
95. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is the "[t]ype of jurisdiction of a court based
on a person's interest in property within the jurisdiction of the court." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990).
96. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 186.
99. Id. at 190 n.4.
100. Id. at 190.
101. Id. at 193.
102. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
103. Shaffer 433 U.S. at 196.
104. Id. at 216-17.
105. Id. at 212.
106. Id.
107. The Shaffer Court stated that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
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ened the test articulated in International Shoe, namely that a
court must look at a corporation's minimum contacts with the
forum. Shaffer indicated that minimum contacts were to be
applied in all cases, including those of individual defendants.
Many courts and commentators have subsequently inter-
preted the language in Shaffer to mean that the transient rule
is no longer viable."° This application of minimum contacts
in all cases, however, has been attacked,"° because Shaffer in-
volved quasi in rem jurisdiction and is arguably distinguish-
able.
As a result, the outcome of this decision became a matter
of interpretation. The only thing that was clear was that this
decision attacked the rationale in Pennoyer by stating that pres-
ence of property alone may not be sufficient to comply with due
process."'
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny." Id. at 212. This statement has received much attention because of its
ambiguous application. The battle in Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990) centers around this controversy. The judgment of the Burnham Court as-
serts that Shaffer means that minimum contacts do not have to be applied every
time jurisdiction is evaluated, but only in limited circumstances, such as when the
defendant is not present in the forum. Id. at 2121-22. Brennan's concurring opin-
ion interprets Shaffer to mean just what it says: that minimum contacts are to be
applied always, even when the defendant is present.
108. See Joel H. Spitz, Comment, The "Transient Rule" of Personal Jurisdiction: A
Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 181,
187-89 (1989). Extending Shaffer's interpretation of minimum contacts to every
exercise of jurisdiction began to make the transient rule unnecessary. See
Brilmayer et al., supra note 87, at 755 (1988); Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach
to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theoty, 30
EMORY LJ. 729, 744 (1981); Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner A Death War-
rant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L REV. 38, 61
(1979).
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything
but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property sup-
ports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its
continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction
that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
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G. A Return to Transient Jurisdiction?
1. Burnham v. Superior Court: The Issues Involved
The case of Burnham v. Superior Court;"' to some extent,
reinstates the "transient rule" of personal jurisdiction. The case
deserves attention because of the split among the Supreme
Court Justices. Although all Justices agreed in the final judg-
ment, four Justices were anxious to revert back to the rigidity
of Pennoyer,12 while four other Justices pursued the applica-
tion of the International Shoe"' minimum contacts test. This,
they believed, was the only way due process could be achieved,
since the defendant's presence was unrelated to the litigation.
2. The Factual Context of Burnham
Mr. and Mrs. Burnham and their children lived in New
Jersey."' Upon separation, they decided that Mrs. Burnham
would have custody of the children and would move to Califor-
nia."' Mrs. Burnham and petitioner husband agreed that she
would file in California for the uncontested divorce on the
grounds of "irreconcilable differences. " '
After Mrs. Burnham and the children moved to California,
Mr. Burnham, reneged on the agreement and filed for divorce
in New Jersey, not for irreconcilable differences, but for deser-
tion."' However, he did not attempt to serve Mrs. Burnham
with process or obtain an issuance of summons against her."'
Mrs. Burnham brought suit for divorce in California when he
refused to adhere to the prior agreement." 9
When Mr. Burnham came to California for business and
to visit his children, he was served with a California court
111. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
112. I& at 2109-15.
113. Id. at 2120-25.
114. Id. at 2109.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. In New Jersey, Mr. Burnham would have received the benefits of its
desertion statutes, in that he could have been able to ask for support from his
spouse. Additionally, he would benefit from forum shopping (choosing the New
Jersey forum rather than California) by not having to travel to defend a suit.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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summons."n He later moved to quash the service of process
for lack of personal jurisdiction because he did not have the
requisite "minimum contacts" with the state. He contended
that his trip to California was unrelated to the pending
suit.' Thus, the Court was asked to decide whether due pro-
cess requires any connection between defendant's contacts
with the forum and the pending litigation when the defendant
is physically present within the state.
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Prior to Burnham v. Superior Court," service of process
was the accepted, nationwide formula for exercising in perso-
nam jurisdiction over nonresidents within the forum. It took
just four concurring opinions in Burnham to shatter this tradi-
tional view of transient jurisdiction. In doing so, the Court
failed to reconstruct a single, applicable jurisdictional theory.
After this decision, there is no black letter law for courts
to apply."' The argument between the Justices leaves only
obscure nuances about ways in which the state courts may wish
to handle jurisdiction. Uniformity will be sacrificed and contra-
dictory holdings will be the result of the Supreme Court's un-
willingness to articulate and enforce one particular approach
to the problem.
The very purpose of rules governing jurisdiction is to
ensure an adherence to due process. Due process concerns
120. Id. The use of California's long-arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over Mr.
Burnham is questionable. The statute provides that "[a] court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Find-
ing no answers to the proper exercise of jurisdiction, the parties were eventually
forced to ask the Supreme Court to determine jurisdictional requirements.
121. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
122. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
123. After Burnham, the question of personal jurisdiction is unsettled. Which
of Burnham's four opinions a state court may follow is unknown. In terms of
numbers, Brennan's approach prevails, with three other Justices firmly behind him
(Scalia's opinion is backed by three other Justices also, but Justice White concurs
only in part). With the induction of Justice Souter to fill Brennan's position in
late 1990, and Justice Thomas replacing Marshall in 1991, no predictable results
can be discerned. The question of jurisdiction is not a question of conservative or
liberal viewpoints, as evidenced by Justice O'Connor's concurrence with Justice
Brennan here. However, the present make-up of the Court leaves only Justices
O'Conner and Blackmun to uphold Brennan's position.
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have become the cornerstone of every jurisdictional inquiry.
With this in mind, how can due process possibly be met after
the Burnham case? We are left with no established rule and no
guidance as to when a defendant makes himself amenable to a
lawsuit.
Although these concerns may not be answered by examin-
ing the four opinions in detail, these varying viewpoints can
provide insight as to the reasons the Courtchose to review the
case, why there was such a conflict between the Justices, and
where this decision will lead us in the future.
IV. ANALYSIS
In one of the concurring opinions in Burnham v. Superior
Court, Justice Stevens referred to the case as an "easy" one.'
He announced: "Perhaps the adage about hard cases making
bad law should be revised to cover easy cases."'
This section discusses whether Burnham really is an "easy"
case and why it was chosen among thousands of cases to be re-
viewed by the highest court of the land. This section also ques-
tions whether this decision sets a bad precedent, regardless of
the agreement in judgment. For these purposes, each opinion
by the Justices is analyzed to achieve a more comprehensive
understanding of the inconsistencies in this opinion.
A. A Critical Analysis of the Opinion
1. Locked Into Tradition: The Judgment of the Court
The judgment of the Court in Burnham was announced by
Justice Scalia, and supported by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ken-
nedy,"6 and in part, by Justice White.' This opinion firmly
indicates their support for the traditional transient rule of
jurisdiction that originated in Pennoyer v. Neff 2 and also
marks their unwillingness to depart from precedent.
Scalia's opinion resorted to the traditional norm that due
process is not violated when one is personally served with pro-
cess in a state, even when the suit is unrelated to activities in
124. 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2126 (1990).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2109-19.
127. Id. at 2119-20.
128. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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that forum. The three Justices supporting this view relied upon
this ancient rule solely because of its historical following."
Their only justification that this rule was presently consistent
with societal demands was their assertion that "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice," the test used to deter-
mine the viability of due process, would change along with
society and the American people."s
Scalia saturated his opinion with case precedent justifying
the traditional rule. He argued that this principle developed
from early English common law'' and that these common
law roots should be adhered to. He cited to Justice Story,
3 2
the man responsible for implanting these roots into American
society, and tried to persuade us that the views which are so
heavily ingrained in American tradition should not be altered.
After this elaborate portrayal of the influence this tradi-
tional rule has had on our judicial system, Scalia did admit that
the English use of this rule of transient jurisdiction had been
criticized and might not even be accurate, but nonetheless,
American courts have adopted it and followed it for many
years. 33
Scalia supported his argument by citing to numerous deci-
sions upholding his view of tradition, and stated, "[a]lthough
research has not revealed a case deciding the issue in every
State's courts, that appears to be because the issue is so well
settled that it went unlitigated.""'3 His reliance on the tradi-
tional rule was further justified, he argued, because of the fact
that no case until 1978 even suggested that service of process
was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.' Thus, Scalia's over-
riding rationale was that since the traditional rule based on
physical presence alone had never been questioned, then it
must comport with due process.
129. 110 S. Ct. at 2116-17.
130. Id. at 2110.
131. Id. at 2110-11.
132. Id. at 2112. See infra note 167.
133. 110 S. Ct. at 2111. "Recent scholarship has suggested that English tradi-
tion was not as clear as Story thought . . . .Accurate or not ...one must con-
clude that Story's understanding was shared by American courts . I..." d
134. Id. at 2111-12.
135. Id. at 2112. Justice Scalia failed to mention which 1978 case challenged
this use of service of process.
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After an analysis of the early case law in this area, Scalia
tried to reconcile the case of Shaffer v. Heitner,'" which fo-
cused on the minimum contacts test. He said that the petition-
er in Burnham went too far in his assertion that there cannot
be jurisdiction over an individual defendant unless the litiga-
tion arises from his activities within the state.' Scalia made a
distinction between the facts in Shaffer and the facts in the
present case by recognizing that Shaffer involved an absent
defendant, rather than one present in the forum.'" His logic
was that the holding in Shaffer "does not compel the conclu-
sion that physically present defendants must be treated identi-
cally to absent ones."39
Scalia also attempted to distinguish Shaffer because it in-
volved quasi in rem jurisdiction.40 For this reason, Scalia con-
cluded that the holding in that decision must be narrowly con-
strued. He believed that Shaffer stands for nothing more than
the proposition that "when the 'minimum contact' that is the
substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership,
it must, like other minimum contacts, be related to the litiga-
tion." '4 Scalia had no interest in treating the language in
Shaffer as a vehicle to apply minimum contacts in all situations,
whether the defendant is present or absent in the forum.
In Scalia's view, a state has power over anyone or anything
physically present within that state. Neither Shaffer nor Interna-
tional Shoe was intended to change the traditional notion of
transient jurisdiction.
2. Brennan's Contemporary Notions of Due Process Test
In his opinion, Justice Brennan sought to solve the incon-
sistencies created when a defendant's presence subjects him to
jurisdiction, even when his presence is unrelated to the litiga-
tion: His approach, the "contemporary notions of due process
test," 142 carries forth the principles articulated in Shaffer v.
136. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 96-107.
137. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2116.
140. Id. See supra note 95 (defining quasi in rem jurisdiction).
141. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
142. Id. at 2120.
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Heitner. "" In his opinion, Brennan stated that: "The critical
insight of Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient
ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.""
What Brennan added to the Shaffer test"' is a more concrete
notion of what due process requirements entail.
Brennan's approach evaluates factors of fairness to ensure
that the defendant is fairly subject to a legal suit in a far away
forum. Under this approach, a defendant becomes amenable
to service of process if: (1) he has had the requisite amount of
minimum contacts with that state and (2) these contacts are
sufficient to comply with contemporary notions of due pro-
cess. '46 In an examination of the contacts with the forum, the
Court is permitted to subjectively analyze factors of fairness,
i.e., any exigent circumstances that could render jurisdiction
more or less fair in relation to the defendant's activities.'
47
The aim of the contemporary notions of due process test
is to comport with due process in all exercises of jurisdiction.
This goal can be more readily achieved by Brennan's test than
by a rule based on presence alone, because all relevant factors
are taken into account by the judges on an ad hoc basis. This
allows fairness to play a significant role.
In order to achieve due process, Brennan relied upon the
doctrine set forth in International Shoe v. Washington.
4
8
Brennan proposed to apply the minimum contacts test to non-
resident defendants who are present in the forum. 49 He be-
143. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
144. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (emphasis added). Brennan states that
"[w]hile our holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction,
our mode of analysis was not." Id. at 2121. Afterall, Brennan participated in the
Shaffer decision and is in a far better position than Scalia to know the intent of
Shaffer's language.
145. See supra note 107.
146. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120.
147. Id. at 2124-25.
148. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
149. Generally, minimum contacts were only applied to corporations. The rea-
son for this is that the transient rule was deemed to comply with due process, so
all that was necessary to obtain jurisdiction over them was their presence. Corpo-
rations could never be present in every state they did business, so minimum con-
tacts with the state became the measure to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
them. In the present case, since Brennan did not believe presence comports with
due process anymore, he proposed adding the additional safeguard of minimum
contacts to individual defendants. 110 S. CL at 2121.
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lieved that Shaffer v. Heitner"5 called for this application to all
defendants, regardless of presence or absence in the fo-
rum." This is contrary to the presence rule because under
that theory, there is no need to inquire into other factors since
presence alone comports with due process. Brennan believed
that an application of minimum contacts is necessary because
that is the only way that due process could be served. 52
Brennan was also opposed to Scalia's deference to histori-
cal pedigree. He did not agree with the reasoning that the tra-
ditional rule is constitutional merely because it always has
been. ' He was concerned that this ancient rule is too nar-
rowly focused and does not take into account changes that
occur in modern society.5 He believed that tradition hides
progress, and that due process may be violated when following
a rule that has only a traditional foundation.55
The transient rule, however, is not totally discarded by the
contemporary notions approach. Brennan explained that
presence does raise a strong presumption for complying with
due process,""7 not because of its historical pedigree, but be-
cause the rule is consistent with reasonable expectations."
For example, contacts with the state give rise to certain risks,
one of which is defending a suit in that forum. In conjunction
with this, Brennan believed that voluntary presence will some-
times comport to due process under limited circumstances, as
a result of the "purposeful availment test" from Hanson v.
Denckla. 9 Brennan 'explained that when a defendant avails
himself of significant benefits provided by the state, this justi-
fies the exercise of jurisdiction by that state." He included
within those benefits the fact that the defendant's "[h]ealth
150. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
151. 110 S. Ct. at 2105.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2120.
154. Id. at 2120-21.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2124.
157. He stated that the historical background "is relevant because [it] provides
a defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today 'clear notice that [he] is
subject to suit' in the forum." (quoting World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 110 S. Ct. at 2124.
158. 110 S. Ct. at 2124.
159. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
160. 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 n.12.
10111992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emer-
gency services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and
waterways; and he likely enjoys the fruits of the State's econo-
my as well.""
A major criticism of Brennan's contemporary notions of
due process test is that it leaves too much discretion with the
judges. 12 They are allowed to determine whether due process
has been met, and which factors to include and exclude in
assessing fairness. 63 The criticism, for all practical purposes,
is without merit. This discretion is not new to the judicial sys-
tem. Discretion has always been left to judges to make such
determinations; the only difference with this approach is that it
is straightforward in its subjectivity rather than hidden. In fact,
making such determinations are part of their judicial duties.
In Brennan's application of the contemporary notions test,
however, little judicial discretion is actually being exercised. He
found that the requisite minimum contacts were present in
Burnham because when the defendant stepped foot in Califor-
nia, he enjoyed the benefits of that state." It is argued that
his test adds little to the traditional rule because as soon as the
defendant is physically present, jurisdiction will automatically
adhere because he immediately enjoys the benefits of the fo-
rum state." An application of the contemporary notions of
due process test does, however, force the reviewing court to
look beyond whether the defendant is present or absent in the
forum. The test would essentially require an added dimension
of fairness, which is a monumental change from the traditional
view.
B. Burnham's Reflection on the Certiorari Policy
When such a fragmented decision is handed down by the
Supreme Court, the initial response is confusion as to why the
case was reviewed by the Court at all. When over ninety- eight
percent of all petitions for certiorari are denied by the Court
161. Id. at 2125.
162. See id. at 2117. Justice Scalia criticizes Brennan's test in that it "measures
state-court jurisdiction . . . against each Justice's subjective assessment of what is
fair and just." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2124-25, 2126.
165. See text accompanying infra note 175.
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when the United States is not a party,'" it is curious to see
that they chose a divorce case.
One reason may be that they were seeking to overturn or
modify the age-old precedent concerning in personam jurisdic-
tion. The Court's intent may have been to demonstrate their
concerns about possible due process challenges resulting from
the rigidity of the transient rule, and in so doing, to suggest a
doctrine for state courts to follow.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's inability or unwilling-
ness to hand down a majority opinion, combined with the frag-
mented viewpoints of the Justices, leaves only confusion. The
Supreme Court seems to be delegating these issues to the state
courts, since it obviously cannot agree on a single standard.
C. Hostilities Among the Justices
The written opinions generated by this case alluded to
open hostilities between the Justices on the Court. This opin-
ion is unusually graphic in its harsh reference towards the
"other" viewpoint,'67 and in its questionable professionalism
when criticizing the other side. Scalia spent nearly three pages
in this opinion attacking Brennan's approach to the
problem."6 These concerns merit analysis.
Scalia made his initial assault on Brennan's use of a broad
interpretation of the language in Shaffer as a justification for
discarding the presence requirement."6 He announced that
the use of the minimum contacts test in the present context
misinterpreted the prior case law, and that the phrase in
Shaffer that "all assertions of state- court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
166. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 258 (6th ed. 1986).
167. 110 S. Ct. at 2111. Much of Scalia's argument for keeping the transient
rule stemmed from a treatise written by Justice Story in 1846. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 553-54 (1846). This seems to be the
origin of the American basis of the transient rule. In his commentary, Justice
Story stated that "every nation may . . . rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all
persons within its domains." Id.
168. Scalia attacked Brennan's assertion that this traditional rule has historically
carried little weight. 110 S. Ct. at 2112 n.3. In this note, Scalia criticized Brennan
for not citing "case [or] commentators from the relevant period to support his
thesis . . . and instead relies upon modern secondary sources that do not men-
tion, and were perhaps unaware of, many of the materials I have discussed." Id.
169. Id. at 2117.
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Shoe and its progeny" had been clearly misunderstood.70 In
criticizing Brennan for undertaking this approach, Scalia failed
to recognize that prior case law had never prohibited the use
of minimum contacts for individual defendants who are physi-
cally present in the forum. In doing so, Scalia failed to give
credit to Brennan's inventive use of minimum contacts, which
may have some value.
Justice Scalia next denounced Brennan's proposal of ap-
plying contemporary notions of due process."' He stated that
this new approach was an unnecessary extension of the tradi-
tional rule, because the traditional rule will satisfy due process
by its very nature. He believed that the "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" that are to be applied in as-
sessing the validity of due process would change as the Ameri-
can people change and as society grows. Scalia would
rather have the American people be the force behind the
meaning of due process, rather than have the Justices make
that decision."' He declared that the courts cannot compel
states to limit or abandon the presence requirement based on
the individual Justice's perception of fairness.7
An analysis of this opinion demonstrates not only Scalia's
firm reliance on precedent and his resistance to change, but
also, the contrasting personalities which are magnified when
Scalia resorts to open hostilities to make the better of the argu-
ment. It is ironic that a neutral subject matter such as jurisdic-
tion creates such a heated argument, when we expect this type
of disagreement only on emotional issues, i.e., abortion, the
right to die, and the death penalty.
D. The Value of this Opinion
Burnham is a significant decision because it was the first
time the Supreme Court reviewed the question of nonresident
defendants whose presence is unrelated to the litigation. How-
170. Id. at 2116.
171. Id. at 2117.
172. Id. at 2119. When explaining the difference between his viewpoints and
Justice Brennan's, Scalia stated that this case stands for "whether changes are to
be adopted as progressive by the American people or decreed as progressive by





ever, because it is a plurality decision, its precedential value is
weakened. Even so, this decision can be employed in many
ways. The legal community can choose to discard it, and treat
it as useless; they can choose to adopt one of the viewpoints
and make it applicable in state courts; or they can pick and
choose from the various opinions and extract a better ap-
proach for courts to follow. Thus, the different approaches for
the exercise of jurisdiction could prove to be extremely benefi-
cial, regardless of the lack of a majority opinion.
These opinions, however, certainly do provide guidance
on the state of the law. Every Justice relied on the transient
rule to some extent, thereby confirming the value of this an-
cient rule. In addition, Brennan opened the door for the appli-
cation of minimum contacts. in new circumstances, such as
individual defendants and defendants physically present in the
forum.
A major inconsistency in the Burnham case concerns the
final judgment. All the Justices agreed that Mr. Burnham may
be served with process within California, and that his presence
there complied with due process requirements. The fact that
Brennan joined in the final judgment may mean that
Brennan's contemporary notion's test is not such a radical
departure from the traditional rule of jurisdiction. Indeed,
Scalia points out that:
Justice Brennan's long journey is a circular one, leaving
him, at the end of the day, in complete reliance upon the
very factor he sought to avoid: The existence of a continu-
ing tradition is not enough, fairness also must be consid-
ered; fairness exists here because there is a continuing
tradition. 7
One reason, however, why Brennan may have voted in
favor of jurisdiction may be based on public policy. The fact
that Mr. Burnham was forum shopping to receive the benefits
of New Jersey law may have influenced Brennan in his deci-
sion.
175. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118.
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V. PROPOSAL: THE DISTANT FORUM ABUSE TEST
In the Burnham v. Superior Court76 opinion, Justice Scalia
and Justice Brennan demonstrated two contradictory view-
points. Scalia's adoption of the traditional rule, although clear
and unambiguous, merely defers to geographical preference,
and comports to due process simply because it always has com-
ported to due process. Conversely, Brennan proposes a subjec-
tive analysis inquiring into the particular circumstances of the
case to determine if due process has been met. Their extremist
positions in this plurality decision are undoubtedly going to
cause jurisdictional problems within the legal community. The
enormous gap between their views is too wide and much too
vulnerable for the state courts to reconcile.
It is imperative that the Supreme Court adopt a firm rule
of in personam jurisdiction, and even more essential that they
stand by it, since this type of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to
any law suit. All potential litigants deserve to know when they
make themselves subject to suit in a foreign state, but the
Burnham decision leaves them only with uncertainty. It is not
clear at what point a potential defendant crosses the line and
makes himself amenable to a lawsuit.
After Burnham, it is evident that the Supreme Court Justic-
es need to compromise and adopt an approach to in personam
jurisdiction that fills in the gap left by that decision. This can
be achieved by the Distant Forum Abuse Test. This test would
combine the two opposing opinions in Burnham by utilizing
both presence and minimum contacts, but also requires the
contacts to be defined and certain.
The basic rationale for the Distant Forum Abuse Test
derives from the fact that notions of territoriality and state
sovereignty, which justify a state's control within its borders,
have diminished as a result of a more mobile society. This
trend explains why presence alone should not be the influen-
tial factor in conferring jurisdiction on a nonresident individu-
al.
The application of this test only seeks to alter procedure
when the nonresident defendant is not a corporation. A non-
resident individual and a nonresident corporation possess obvi-
176. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
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ous inherent differences. These differences justify the use of
different rules for granting jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a corporation should continue to be
evaluated according to the minimum contacts test set forth in
International Shoe v. Washington,'" but that test alone is much
too burdensome on an individual defendant. A corporation
bears an infinite measure of power and influence, and in addi-
tion, consumes tremendous amounts of resources within the
state. An individual, on the other hand, will be more heavily
burdened by traveling to the distant forum and will consume
far less of the state's resources.
The transient rule, in which presence is the sole factor,
cannot alone meet constitutional standards for either defen-
dants or corporations. A tremendous strain would be imposed
on all aspects of interstate travel if a state could subject an
individual to suit by virtue of geography. Travel between states
would become infrequent if an individual were compelled to
answer to a suit for reasons unrelated to his activities while in
that state. The presence rule could arguably deter all types of
contacts with other states, since a potential defendant would
be apprehensive in entering another state for fear of being
served with process. Situations arise where gross injustice
would occur if the defendant were made amenable to juris-
diction based solely on presence, i.e., an unconscious man who
is flown to the forum state to receive medical attention, or a
professional athlete who travels to participate in his sport.
The Distant Forum Abuse Test 1'7 takes all of these fac-
tors into account. Under this proposal, a nonresident defen-
dant becomes amenable to service of process when present in
the state if:
(1) The contact with the state is directly related to the
suit; and
(2) The defendant himself has proximately caused the
contact to be related to the forum.
No other factors may be considered. This would eliminate
consideration of the following: the "burden on defendant," the
177. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
178. This proposal seeks to alleviate the uncertainty of when jurisdiction atta-
ches. The Burnham court never addressed this problem.
179. One example would be when the defendant in a divorce suit travels to
the forum to seek custody or to reconcile a property settlement.
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"forum state's interest in adjudicating the suit," the "plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," or the
"interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies. "180
This test is similar to Brennan's contemporary notions
test"" because both presence and minimum contacts are uti-
lized, although limitations are imposed on both. This test
would create uniformity and would provide defendants with
absolute foreseeability as to when they subject themselves to
jurisdiction. These equitable considerations are part of the
safeguards that are necessary for this test to comport with due
process requirements.
An application of this test to the facts in Burnham would
conclude that a California court would not have jurisdiction
over Mr. Burnham because Part One of the test is not satis-
fied. The contact is not directly related to the divorce suit. The
reason Mr. Burnham was in California was for business pur-
poses and to visit his children. The basis of their suit was an
agreement concerning the grounds for divorce. Even though
custody is often an important consideration in divorce cases, it
is incidental to determining the basis for a divorce.
Under these facts, the analysis ceases and there can be no
jurisdiction. Part Two of the analysis applies when the contact
with the forum is directly related, but the defendant did not
cause the contact to be related to the forum. This prevents any
possibility that a defendant is fortuitously or fraudulently in-
duced into a state for purposes of service of process.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has focused on the development of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, which has recently become a complex issue
as a result of the 1990 Supreme Court decision, Burnham v.
Superior Court." Furthermore, this discussion analyzed the
four opinions that were handed down in this confusing case in
order to discern the Court's perceptions on in personam juris-
180. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
181. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-26.
182. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
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diction and to provide insight as to the current state of the
law.
Burnham has not conclusively solved the problem of an
application of transient jurisdiction. There is a need for the Su-
preme Court to choose an agreeable standard to follow to
provide uniformity and clarity, so that potential defendants can
foresee the possibility of defending a lawsuit in a distant fo-
rum. One proposal to alleviate these problems is the use of the
Distant Forum Abuse Test for individual defendants. This test
is a viable alternative because it combines the extreme propos-
als in Burnham, but adds an element of certainty. Under this
test, due process would presumably be satisfied because certain
definite factors of fairness would be influential in assessing
jurisdiction, and subjectivity would be minimized. This test
poses an appropriate solution to the problem created by the
Burnham decision.
Whatever test is chosen, it is essential that the Court
choose the test which best complies with due process consider-
ations. Each Justice on the Supreme Court, however, has a
different idea of what due process entails. Therefore, the
Court's agreement on a test for in personam jurisdiction may
not be reached until far in the future.
Christine M. Daleiden
1992] 1019

